macarthur on this list to begin? >> no. one of the reasons they weren't is everybody knows of macarthur. everybody knows, and i have in the past written of both and especially george patton, but when you mentioned the name themistocles or flavius belisarius are ridgway, people don't know who you are talking about. i think colin powell is the service for ridgway who died at 98, in 1993. but we knew who he was. you and the military over this man more than any other, nobody had really known what happened to them. he just sort of faded away so i tried to bring public attention to people who are out of the collective attention span. >> that's just a little taste of victor hansen's newest book, military book, "the savior generals" is the title of the. if you go to booktv.org you can see many videos with victor davis hanson talking about his

book, as well as a longer version of him in fresno talking about this book. you are watching booktv on c-span2. >> ira katznelson presents the history of the new deal. he argues that in order to pass the host for legislation, the roosevelt administration had to broker a deal with southern politicians who wish to maintain racial segregation that limited policies and did not cease until the civil rights act of 1964. >> anyone who loves american history finds it a privilege to be in this building to be invited to speak your is especially gratifying. shortly before his death in 2007, one of the great historians of the new deal, arthur schlesinger, jr., wrote the following, conceptions of

the past, he noted, are far from stable. they are perennially revised by the urgencies of the presence. when new urgencies arise in our own times and lives, historians spotlight shifts, probably no into the shadows, throwing out sharp release things that were always there but that earlier historians had excised from collective memory. new voices ring out of the historical darkness and demand attention. when i begin to write this book in a serious way, just after i read those words by professor schlesinger, i came across some very surprising voices, surprising to me out of the darkness as it were of american history of the 1930s and 1940s. so let me begin just by reporting on or noting three or

four of those voices. the first belongs to walter lippman. walter lippman was arguably the single most important journalist of that time. and he wrote the following in 1939, not in 1933 when president roosevelt, answered famously declared the firm belief that the only thing we tend to fear is fear itself. in 1939 he wrote the following the three times in these 20 years the american people have had great hope, and three times they have been greatly disappointed. and the three disappointments that he was referring to in 1939 were, first, the promise that democracy would triumph globally after the first world war.

second, that capitalism, the market economy, would produce an enduring prosperity, which it seemed to be doing in the 1920s. and the third disappointment that he noted was the failure of the new deal to quash fear. that surprised me. it was the same walter lippman who, one week after franklin roosevelt was a doctorate in march 1933, and we used to a doctorate our presidents in march, not january, it was the same lippmann who had written one week after the inauguration, the nation which had lost confidence in everything and everybody has repaired its confidence in the government and in itself. so what, why disappointment? not many years later, half a dozen years later. and that might be observed that

the 1933 lippmann is the lippmann most historians remember, or the new deal most historians remember. the new deal that converted fear to confidence. a second voice, this voice belongs to senator james eastland of mississippi, 1944. the united states, july 1944, the united states was at war, and with more than 10 million soldiers under arms, and deciding at that moment that congress actually deciding from the period january-july 1944 how, if at all, soldiers could devote. recall that the election of 1944 took place after d-day. we had soldiers on the ground in

europe, and sailors on ships throughout the pacific. how could they vote? the roosevelt administration supposed that every soldier in the field, that is, soldiers who could not get absentee ballots, should be handed a federal ballot, they could fill it in, write the name dewey or president roosevelt as their preferred candidate for office. instead, a bill sponsored by james eastland of mississippi and john rankin of mississippi passed into law. and that bill was justified by eastland in the following way. these boys, hero, are fighting to maintain the rights of the states. these boys are fighting to maintain white supremacy. that's a precise quote stated on the floor of the u.s. senate. or hear one more voice.

the great writer eb white, writing to the "herald" tribune in november 1947, a letter to the tribune in which he began, i live in an age of fear. and the last voice to begin my remarks belongs to dwight eisenhower on the day he was inaugurated in january 1953. science, ma he noted, seems ready to confer on humankind its final gift the power to erase human life from this planet. now, these voices, the voices, the kinds of voices that i believe had not been fully attended in new deal histories, remind us that the concerns about fear did not stop in 1933

or 34 or 35 or 36. but fear remained a constant feature of american public life throughout the 1930s and 1940s. and it was that recognition, multidimensional quality of fear that led me to write the book "fear itself." now, inviting i thought the only true justification for writing a new book on the new deal, if you were to go to the library and punch in new deal on the computer, catalog, thousands of entries would come. so right -- so why write another book. it was those voices that motivated me to write another book. but to motivate me also of those voices, motivated me to think about the relationship between fear and democracy in our time,

when we, too, live in an age of fear. we confront economic volatility, global religious zealous he, military and security. so listening to those somewhat forgotten voices from the past, i decided to write about the 1930s and 1940s to better understand the relationship of democracy and fear. our time has produced anxiet ans perhaps not of the same magnitude, but i believe we are being tested in similar ways. so by exploring how the new deal dealt with such challenges, fear itself probes not just the achievements but the cost of what was doing that was necessary to preserve liberal democracy and to protect its values. the book investigates fear and democracy by offering four shifts in perspective.

the first is quite simple, at least at first glance. i asked him what i mean by the new deal through the truman administration. after all, harry truman was franklin roosevelt's last vice president. most historians of the new deal stop typically in 1938 or 39. 38 was the year of the last major new deal piece of domestic legislation passed. the fair labor standards act that gave us the minimum wage and a 40 hour week. 1939 of course was the year the second world war began in europe, and some historians of course go as far as 1945, tearing through the age of roosevelt himself. the great historian david kennedy does that in his book, freedom from fear. but i thought to continue through to the truman administration, not just because

harry truman had been part of the roosevelt era, but because by continuing up until 1952, 53, we can see some features of modern reality that might have remained somewhat obscure it to in particular. the first concerns the layering of fear in american life. now, fear is generated by circumstances that go beyond those of ordinary risk. life is full of risk. we buy a home, we hope it goes up in value. until recently we always thought it went up in value. we married. half of marriages today don't end well. they end in divorce. but we have a sense that we know something about the parameters of risk when we buy a home or

married. but there are some circumstances that seem absolutely unique that shatter our understanding of the status quo, that make it difficult, even impossible, to reckon with the true dimensions of risk. the collapse of capitalism after 1929 was such a fear generating experience. certainly for americans. unemployment rate hit 25%. in an age when most women were not in the labor force, that meant that something like half of american adults were, as it were, without substance unemployment. but it was not just the collapse of the market economy that generated fear in that 20 year period between the migration of franklin roosevelt and the inauguration of dwight d. eisenhower.

weeks, just weeks, five weeks before roosevelt was elected -- sorry, was inaugurated as president, adolph hitler became chancellor of germany. and just 19 days after the roosevelt inauguration, the german reichstag voted to hand over all legislative power to the cabinet of the chance of hitler, thus beginning formally as in some sense legally the german dictatorship of the third reich. this is also a period where mussolini's dictatorship in rome was thought to be immensely successful. and it was a period in which many people around the globe, including a good many americans, admired the experiment in bolshevik russia under stalin. now, those dictatorships generated fear. they generated the fear that they were somehow superior to

liberal representative democracies in solving big problems. after all, we in america, european countries like france and britain, have very complicated procedures that stood between a problem and it's solution. we are of course the money with uthis today. congress doesn't just rise up immediately and solve pressing problems. congress has to grapple with those problems through very complex procedures, divided and polarized parties and ideologi ideologies, with often shaped by the influence of there is interest groups and money and politics. there is no clear rude from the problem -- clear rude, and that was the case in the 1930s. that was a source of fear. did we have institutions that

could grapple with the collapse of capitalism and meet the test of the dictatorship, and that layering of fear was soon followed by the great violence of the second world war. unprecedented violence, far greater even than the first war, putting civilians at remarkably greater risk than they had been in the first war, and causing deaths and casualties in multiple ways, including as we learned after the war, the holocaust, and, of course, culminating in the use of a comic weapons at hiroshima and nagasaki. ..

in its full dimensions when we extend to administration, we can also see an outcome to remain at a scene if we we stopped in 1938 or 1945. by 1952, the city, washington had become the home of each hematocrit you kind of federal government, one that it's simply not existed or even been

anticipated in 1927, 28, 29, 30, 31. that government had to pieces, like the roman god. one face was domestic affairs. we have been 1952 by the eisenhower election in much larger federal government than any american dream is having 20 years earlier headed the national government of social security in middle age maximum hours and a variety of new federal agencies that bureaucracies securities the securities and exchange commission regulating wall street and on and on. its detailed legacy we know, but that national state continued to develop through the truman

administration with a particular twist in determining years. in the mid-1930s, congress passed the wagner act to create a legal framework for the national labor relations act that created a framework within which trade unions could organize. 31935 and late 1940s, there was a dramatic upward increase in the proportion of americans who belong to unions. that number peaked at 35% in 1954 and has been declining ever since. today comes something like 7% of americans in the area belonged to trade unions. as late as 1946, 47, that trend seems likely to continue as far as the eye can see.

it was expected by many, including many new dealers that the future of the american economy and policy would be shaped decisively by the darkening game between organized labor and organized business. but in 1847, congress passed the hartley act, which i'll come back to, time permitting, in a few moments, or radically, sharply limited the capacity of unions to organize and passed by a vote joining republicans in southern democrat who together overrode his veto that bill by president truman. the impact of the new law was essentially to make it impossible for organized labor to become a national political

force because the authorized rate to work was, which are now in the news again, but which then when the racially limited to seven state. this house, state after state, past right to work laws, which made it difficult for unions to organize and bass, by the end of the 1940s and early 1980s, there was already clear that the new pic american national government would not be the site of national competition so much between organized business and organized labor, that would be a national state in which tens of different kinds of interest groups would fight for influence and power. and our client centered interest group state was born by the end of the truman years.

i was one side of the created. the second side of the new national state that was created and instantiated in the truman years was a new national security state. the united states had no army to speak of when franklin roosevelt came to power. by the end of the truman years, by far the united states was the strongest power on earth and all the institutions we recognize today at the heart of our national security state, the joint chiefs of staff, national security council from essential intelligence agency and on more created after the second world war in the truman years, also includes the atomic energy commission. this new set of institutions gave us a second dice to a

national state and into shorthand version, whereas the domestic interest group centered national state with the state pick with procedures, but in an ap or a sense interest, what democracy produced as democracy produces the affordable health care a comment that because the public interest. if democracy produced a repeal of the affordable health care act, that would be defined as the public interest. that is today. that's a democracy developed in the late 1940s. strong on procedures, but without a very strong accents in the public interest. the national security state we created was precisely the inverse of that.

that is to say it was tasty with a strong sense of public interest. the united states in the globe was battling for, as a battle today for democracy, against dictatorships, against forms of anti-democratic zealotry. that's a powerful sense of galvanizing public interest. but it's also national state, relatively weak on procedures. in contrast to the domestic state, very few constraints on what the national security state can do. the issue of drones and american citizens is very much in the news these days. it's one example and the sense of the question, but one example of a nasty most security state in many ways insulated from the normal or seizures and processes it democratic politics.

so by extending the truman administration -- to the truman administration, we see fear and we see an outcome. the kind of national state we live within today. the second both the bush makes us to situate the new deal and the global context. the dictatorships after all to claim to be better democracies. they claim to have solutions because their solutions did not have to travel parliamentary procedures marked by party divisions and ideological polarization or the influence of interest groups and money in politics or forms of corruption. they claim to be direct representatives of the people, the german race in germany.

the italian people come at the italian and realm, the working class and the soviet union. and friends of democracies share to worry that american democracy would not be able to govern effectively. i mentioned walter the name. listen to walter lippman again, this time in february 1933. he advocated a graph of extraordinary power to the incoming president. the teacher he wrote, the danger we have to fear is not that congress will give franklin roosevelt too much power, but that it will deny him the power he needs. the danger is not deliver to you, but we shall not act with the necessary speed and comprehensiveness of the kind of took leaderships were able to do. and then he proposed

extraordinary authority should we give them the president for it. save when you. you should have the widest and fullest powers under the most liberal interpretation of the constitution. congress should suspend temporarily the rule of palaces to limit drastically the right of amendment and debate, to put the majority in both houses under the decision of the democratic party caucus. and the suppression of, politics he concluded as a necessary thing to do if the american nation desires action and result, this is the way to get them. well, the new deal began in a context of deep anxiety about our capacity that is the

capacity of our institutions to govern. franklin roosevelt kicked up this theme in a largely forgotten part of his famous first inaugural. and this is the third shift in the book is stored as congress and some extent away from the riveting picture of roosevelt. the swift franklin roosevelt said on that day. our constitution is so simple to code that it is possible to use extraordinary need by changes in emphasis and arrangements without loss of essential form. that is a deeply ambiguous sentence. and then he floated with weapons extraconstitutional proposal. it may be unprecedented demand

may cause for a temporary departure from procedures should congress not act decisively. i should not evade the clear course of duty that will confront me. i should ask her the one remaining crisis, not executive power to wage a war against the emergency is greatest power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by foreign bureau. for me the greatest thing about the new deal is that step was never taken. the united states never did suspend congress. congress can't do an increase legislative prerogative, even during the 100 days, the

legislature deal with the economic emergency through ordinary legislation however novel and far-reaching. there is never a state of exception in the united states at the kind that lippman proposed an roosevelt indicated he might ask for. after the 100 days, congressional forms of dispute, debate and decisions survived and thrived and they were intense differences of view about the proper role of government and the character of public policy. they were debated and not good upon within the institutions of the congress. congress was not a casualty of the countries various crises that fashioned fear in the 1930s and 1940s. congress was an instrument of thought to overcome that. and that rings me to the last shift in emphasis in my book. within congress to the american

south. we sometimes forget that the democratic party in the air of roosevelt and truman was an alliance of very strange bedfellows. a non-southern wing of the democratic party largely consisted of urban voters, most of her were immigrants or children of immigrants, catholic and jewish, many of whom voted for political machines. most of them supported what came to be called an invisible but in this tradition liberal political solutions. the american south had no electorate, ever have a small lecture that kept the african-americans are many rights as well outside the

electoral system. and the american south, the democratic party was supported by an electorate that was largely rural, not for being. largely protestant, not catholic or jewish. largely anti-immigrants as opposed to being pro-immigrant. and of course the sharpest division between north and south was the fact the united states at that moment was until the brown decision in 1954 contained 17 state that mandated racial segregation with missouri and south carolina, et cetera, et cetera. 17 states, 34 united states senators. in 1940, every single one was a democrat. 34 united states senators veto

blocking a senate of 96 seats. the south had disproportionately high representation in the house of representatives because we count for constitutional purposes. every person who lives in the population of a given state as the basis for political representation. but the south had an electoral system in which half the majorities of citizens did not or could not vote. example, it's an extreme example to be sure. but 1938, mississippi has seven members of the house of representatives and a population of 2.3 million. collectively, the seven members of the house elected in november november 1938 secured 43,000 votes.

seven people, 43,000 votes and not end with an opponent. so the south had a one-party state, low franchise and that of course gave a nervous advantages to members of congress for not reaching. they got seniority because they didn't face a two party system. they then the committee system. they composed most of the party leadership, lake sam rayburn of texas and later lyndon johnson of texas. because the capacity of the south, nothing could pass into law in the 1930s against the wishes of the southern members of the democratic party. after 1938, democratic party republicans begin to make a comeback, democratic party was

composed by southern majority in the house and senate and in the 1940s, everything that passed into law, not done to the preferences of the southern members of congress. in that sense, it was the south that was critical in making the new american state that denies take an foreign-policy state, national security state. there was this out it was critical after that came the modern new deal. i don't know this is a morality tale, though it is ethically charged features. this was the way things were in the 1930s and 1940s. as historians and social science is to think hard about the implications of that and the

implications of the capacity of the american south in the last era of jim crow. that capacity had more than one kind of impact. let me just briefly illustrate with two or three quick examples. the first great piece of legislation of the roosevelt years for the economy was the national industrial recovery act, which created agreements between business, labor and government on how different set tears as the economy should work. it was declared unconstitutional by the supreme court in 1935, but it governs the american economy in the first period of recovery from the great depression. roosevelt did not propose the public works be part of that

bill, but the southern members of congress come from the poorest region of the country insisted on public works and much that we remember, in the first interest was something entries. what can also take the social security act of 1935. they came from a dirt poor region. only one in three households in the south on the land simultaneously had running water and electricity according. they liked the strong washington sending money to the states. but with caveats. the key caveats the inserted in the legislation, the fair labor act would not apply to

farmworkers and maids. that's african-americans stated that in the south. black women worked in white peoples houses in black man actually were on the land. every piece of new deal legislation of the 30s did not include farmworkers and maids. the reversal of that only took place after president eisenhower was in fact it went domestic workers and farmworkers are included in social security. i mentioned the soldiers do not. under that law, soldiers could only get a federal dollar if they stayed in which -- from which they came with her use of the federal dollar in the legislature by the governors. the eastland rankin bill essentially meant southern disenfranchised and would

continue. but here is a surprising, to my eyes, positive feature of something stories do. in july 1941. franklin roosevelt asked congress to extend the peacetime draft. in 1940 with the first peacetime draft in american history, but was hedged with restrictions. they could not leave the western hemisphere. that was a period of isolationism internationalists were debating, should america get involved in the quote. isolationists could vote for a peacetime draft in 1940 because he couldn't lead the western hemisphere. roosevelt looking around in 1941 cents a song to appear beneath the capacity to have a serious armed force that could serve this need it if anywhere in the

globe. the house of representatives voted yes. 230 to 202. if one person has switched votes, would've entered pearl harbor with an army smaller than belgian. we voted yes. the republican party opposed not without reason a peacetime draft is not a war to liberty. many northern democrats voted out. those northern democrats who had irish, italian and german constituents voted no. they're not particularly enamored of grape written, which is a colonial power in ireland and german americans not to a person, but many were deeply wary of the military that might

be sent to fight their own families back in europe. only because a unanimous southern rock voted in favor of a peacetime draft if we have an army in the navy on the evil of pearl harbor, at least in the army, navy seriously equipped to begin to fight the second world war. the last example i've given us the hartley act, which changed the framework in debilitated trade union in the united states at least compared to the wagner act. i might add perhaps finally with respect to the national security state, the american south was the mature partner for international is some as it is the 1940s, 1950s. the majority of the republican party still have grave doubts about a global role for the

united states. senator taft, the republican leader was supposed to nato originally an american troops being stationed in europe and we decided between those on the wallace -- henry wallace said of the democratic party, which blamed the cold war and the united states from the soviet union and did not wish to engage in a global competition and the other side of the northern wing of the party stood with truman in creating the national security state. it took something that is to create the major institutions we know today. in this sense, modern america, the world we know was created in congress through the truman years and decisively by decision-making, lawmaking

decisions taken by representatives from the american south. those representatives were remarkably heterogeneous. they included. dates, brilliant figures like richard grasso of georgia. great political figures like lyndon johnson of texas whose first speech began every third paragraph began with the south. it was a debate about their employment legislation at that point. it also included the southern week of the democratic party and cartoonish brisas but towboat mrs. era james eastland. but what they shared was a common commitment to preserve the south in matters of race. in the 1930s and 1940s, not

one politician come even the most liberal of florida, not whenever publicly opposed racial segregation. so let me close by reading the last two paragraphs of the intricate reach out to her of my book. if history plays tricks, southern congressional power in the last era of jim crow was a big one. the ability of the new deal to come around the most hedonistic readerships by reshaping liberal democracy required accommodating the most violent and a liberal part, keeping the south and site became a democracy. while that would be folly to argue members of the southern wing of the democratic party is known determine the choice is the deal made, their relative

cohesion and assessment of policy choices through the filter of an anxious protection of white supremacy often prove decisive. the triumph in short cannot be severed from the sorrow. liberal democracy pat with racial humiliation and system of lawful exclusion principle terror, each constituted the other bankunited togo of the soul and body this combination can or is a larger message, a lesson that concerns persistence of emergency, and escape the ability of moral ambiguity, perhaps the inevitability of a politics that discomforting allies. it also reminds us not just whether, but how we find our way truly matters.

thank you very much. [applause] there are microphones on both sides. can you identify yourself when you asked the question. >> i was wondering if you could talk about some of the domestic fears. there was a great deal of discussion about communism in the united states, also fears on the right, the ku klux klan, americans nazis, and the two that have on developmental policy. >> the question is what about fear generating voice is and

movements from within american civil society, including the ku klux klan, preachers on the radio, and including movements in america today noting the communist party in people's fear of communism in the united states. each of these realities in dimension of american life amplified that americans lived in a period of -- in which they had to take a journey as sober without a map, a sand for fearfulness that we didn't know. of course there never were maturities of american -- the majority of southerners did not belong to the clan.

the majority of southerners did not lynch, but lynchings continued and the congress was unable to legislate against lynching as a result of the plucking power of the south. not the southern members of congress favorite lynching. if you did, but the great majority were appalled by, but simply because they wished to protect regional autonomy. both the communist party and the german-american skirts so madison square garden in new york, rallies have more than 20,000 people. as late as 1939, the german uniforms in new york city. there's many such roles. there is much recent job as a cause. they signify two things. first of readerships had followers because it was thought they could solve problems

constitutional democracy could not. they had their deal. second, those movements signified that americans were groping for secure floor on which to stand in order to deal with the fear generating realities of the time. yes. >> graininess roger williams. those are interesting and innovative construct from the same point. i had never heard of was that not dictated, which i find almost shocking from today's days. but i'm wondering, what did roosevelts advisors propose to him if you know anything about that. particularly his most liberal

one. did the idea ever gain any traction in congress? >> much of what was said between advisors and the president we don't have access to. we do note that a text was written for the president, which he decided not to deliver just one day after the not puerile in which he spoke to the american legion in the city and the text he chose not to speak said that in addition to the american military, he was going to ask for the creation of an armed force that would report exclusively to the president so as to keep peace and stability under conditions of aggression c. so there clearly were speechwriters who penned those words and thought that was in keeping with the proposals

spoken of in prior day. roosevelt did not utter those words, chose not to. so we can see clearly the drawing of the boundary between keeping the constitution intact versus stepping way over the line and introducing it. >> realize he never took a step like that. [inaudible] >> he willfully chose not to. some of these addresses as late as 1938 come he spoke of that charge and emphasized as much as i emphasized today that he never suspended the american separation of power system. even the famous packing proposal was a proposals at first we should there never went beyond the constitutional limit because he says nothing about the size

of the supreme court. second, when congress said no, the proposal was made and recheck did the supreme court remained as nine. so there of course instances were to talk about if we have more time such as japanese citizens during the war in which the united states did step over a traditional line of constitutional protection, arguably in the conditions of a very special emergent sea. in the hall, the compelling story is not stepping over the line. >> the alliance with soviet union without which the war in europe would have been only at exceptional cost in casualties. recall truman as a senator

opposed giving to the soviet union before vice president. so they could say a few words about the decision to ally ourselves with the soviet union is a necessity of winning the war in europe. >> to have the keywords in the end of the important question are in tension with each other. a decision to ally in the necessity to ally. if the united states had not send weapons to the soviet union after germany attacked the ussr, if the united states had not had the alliance, historians are in complete agreement. there's no question but what if trying in europe. iraq would not have been defeated. it was a soviet union that essentially defeated from the

east. but compellingly, the western invasion could not possibly have succeeded without the movements of germany from the east. but this is a past, in the early church ethically, the soviet union after the terror, after the purges, after the coup having been created. of course, that alliance or what would become of the alliance after the war was a central great question not just a roosevelt or truman, but also churchville, who had to come to terms with the reality when the war ended, soviet troops are sitting well into central europe were not about to leave. so this is not a moment to reflect the origins of the cold

war, but what is clear is the division between east and west exist on the day of the second world war ended. a theme of my book is one philosophers quote dirty hands of a match is called oral ambiguity, life including political lifters of instances where sometimes giving me, which are bad compromises are brought compromises might be necessary on behalf of an instrumental good such as winning the second world war. >> my name is brad patterson. i served 13 years on the white house staff and wrote about the american presidency and the white house.

of the guys if you are looking so well at that. during the reconstruction. at the beginning of the roosevelt administration. the first couple years, one has to roosevelt white house. roosevelt wasted a great deal of time trying to settle arguments among his own advisors and he saw he was the sweetest time that way and he went to a gentleman named brownlow who asked him and others to form the groups take a look at his white house can see if he can make it a more efficient place. it turns out the brown law interpreted to europe in the early 30s from that. and witnessed the rise of hitler and came back to america what was coming over the horizon to face the decision that would face the roosevelt government.

in 1936 as the brown world report was the president needs help and nothing happened for three years. then in 1939, it wasn't the congress and the dentistry in the government. this roosevelt himself with his famous executive order in september 1939, which created and strength in the white house staff, created the section of anonymous assistant. the famous quote was man of great passion and vicar -- great physical vigor and anonymity. from then on, how is one of the beginnings of the strengths and white house when it was mostly -- >> i appreciate that. academics love for us.

franklin roosevelt didn't propose that reorganization act after the commission including rob to try to see how an efficient executive work and the president did issue an executive order, but congress passed a reorganization act of 1939, which surrounded the executive order and gave them some legitimacy. is a case of internal strengthening and another extent over congress had refused the initial proposals and make 1037 maintained its constitutional prerogatives come even under growing conditions of emergent sea. >> the language says it might be better if this had to be done administratively rather than wait for the congress. >> thank you. >> time for one more. >> i remember telling my mother how much her generation who had

a president with other people feel they had fear itself to fear. while i was settled with the president to make its continual business to stoke fear after 9/11 is kind of their stock in trade was generating fear. during that decade, they seem to be working hand-in-hand with the electronic media. we had media anxiety and fear itself by generating kind of a virtual anxiety or fear, you sell a product. is there any -- is there any meaningful difference between the role of the media today and generating fear of any kind in the public and the role that he played that bad in the 30s and 40s? what was their posture that and how did they practice their business vis-à-vis fear prevailing in the country. >> it's a wonderful question and

probably with a good long hour, which we don't have. i think there is three things to remember about the media and not. first is especially the price media, printed price, but also to some extent radio is a more deferential media and to send it certainly didn't probe very much in the private lives of politicians, but was willing to play by background rules, by keeping to the rules of the game established by the president and executive ranch in reporting the news. the second to remember, president roosevelt was a master of new media. both in his very regular press and of course in fireside chats and pioneering use of the radio.

finally, it might be observed to a question asked earlier that the new media, especially the radio was also use of other views and forces included social movement is quite ugly. i mention as a radio priest, largely supported policies that the new deal and by the late 1930s as overtly anti-semantic on the radio. so radio was the new player that had a galvanizing and transformative effect and heralded some of the changes we would later see. but the issue of how the media relates to power remains today a vexing issue.

a short tiny story which is personally important to me. which you mention talking to the family about how they might have been lucky for me. 1952 i was eight years old. stevenson eisenhower election come up with my pairings are loved stevenson. another sad for who are you going to vote? is that i'm not voting. not voting for my parents and i can still see it my grandmother sandra newspaper to. thank you very much.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] you know, when i was in prison i read zukowski book, mr. chairman and i read that book and thrive for the life of me to figure out how he went to prison and the post office scandal. i read it. i read what he did. the siegelman case is interesting because especially the fact they refused to give information.

[inaudible] is just a very fascinating deal and of course aper mouth was involved. >> when he came out a sandwich money did she get away from? $20 million. it's not on this book, but after he got out, [inaudible] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

>> and of course spent all that money. when i got out of morgantown federal prison as he lovingly referred to a cms that bush hasn't program, i did something that i swore it would do, which was to listen to alan rattner telling me i needed to do radio. i don't need anything public to any to be quiet and sit down a little bit. she said you have experiences and knowledge are working history of politics and government so let's do it. the first show we did was tom harkin. of course i knew thom hartmann was. today in washington you to the left or to the right.

she's classified in the air. he knows journalism and he's an accomplished author and other fields have been interested to see the bucs. i was little nervous to meet at the show and really went well and i continued to do the whole radio gig. i did my own show for it but okay. bob new government howard monroe. majesty deign to do but didn't like doing "the daily show." so i continue to do talk radio, which i did to this day adventure to india for a little bit. what do you do when you went to recharge batteries? to go to india. his chapter in this book i was delighted to read, credible and he had and when i go over there i stayed about five or seven minutes walk from the dolly lama's residence. it's a mixture of the indians in tibet and so did there come a

fascinating place that provided me the opportunity to write this book because i was able to go with a couple months and focus on things and come back. and between watching my granddaughter with a 12 step recovery program, assist in such do for some people, i was able to write this book and her editor was absolutely amazing. alan rattner's, francesca minerva was here change a nice price. i never thought i'd do a book, but my cousin, francis wallace beery told the republicans he coined the phrase the gipper and ronald reagan, that was his successful movie, so i was given because an credit for the ronald reagan because of that gipper. because it always told needed to write about. i just never thought i'd write this one i read it this way. so i put a lot of thought into it. didn't do the book at first.

i outlined that in here. and i did 60 minutes at my former chief of staff and neil and i agree to do 60 minutes together and i'll tell you why. they said were going to have jack aper mouth and then neil and the new. neil and i talked and it is better to have the two of us. he shows more than honesty factor. if i see this coming you could say no or vice versa. in my opinion, the two side-by-side is a better way to do that. i went to in the event and for a one-month trip saw 60 minutes over there. i make it clear tonight. so i don't sit here say jack made me have a dinner. i made those decisions. i watched him that 60 minutes and then i started -- a ridiculous amount some empathy as having been imprisoned for

anybody that's done time. beyond that, i just wondered where jack was going with his version of history. when i heard him say he owned at the short end of the stick. he raised too much for us. so i sat there and i thought i want to make it more. i want to make it more than that. he's part of the story and i told the story that i get us constantly by former constituents as they still live in ohio, and the district and i get asked all the time about what happened to you? this tells a very complicated story. it's not as easy as going to scotland and jericho. it's a complicated story, where have i part in some other parts to the appearance of the perfect storm is the way i put together exactly the outside influences that came into help with the

idiocy i created in the crimes they committed. also in the book and important to me, and the cages with iran and the opportunity we missed to potentially have a deal where rambo to have recognized israel, where he ran would have disbanded hezbollah. i sent that deal to the white house and they choose to act nor it and maybe things would've been different. i want to state that part against a recently delisted and i think it's important on the international basis and i was part of that. the other parties about morgantown federal prison. i was a lawmaker admitted to the prison psych which is very challenging. i sat with a high profile person who i first met in the finance committee, the banking

committee. congressman mike oxley rightfully so that removed the handcuffs from the mid. he said you will hear and they did and he came out and testified on the whole whitewater deal. and i find that the first time. the second time is headed to prison. i was a self reporter, like reporting for your own firings was an allen said yes to the hubble horrible. i said i want to go to prison. i sat in washington d.c. the three, four, five and he walked me through how you survive from day one and that's the best amount of time i spent. he came in and said as a former chief justice of the arkansas supreme court who would you praise him and he very aesthetic to the plate of a lot of people in prison. i walked out of prison not angry and i did walk out of prison thinking of the former

congressman now. i walked out feeling a bond with a lot of people in any detail that in this book and i have because things are going on inside these walls. i didn't expect anybody to have sympathy for me. i have the ability to the network and stand here today. by the ability to be in television, have writers with radio and print media and i could write a book and tell my story. a lot of people don't have a voice inside those walls. we are not rehabbing them. we are warehousing. this government under the current industry should have statistics that they took the drug dealers and put them away. ironically became friends that were not the white collar criminals. there's a lot of addicts in prison and become a statistic that was put away. they're not getting treatment for the addiction. the other part is my own personal struggle being recovery with addiction.

a say in the beginning you don't have to be in politics and abuse substances to make your life cutdown. i don't care if you're a waiter, what you do a device profession, whatever you are. you can invest and lose your focus and pay attention to what you're doing. the code on a path that will cause your personal problems. a couple of funny stories about the congress and i give credit to members of congress, which both sides of the island this book comes some things that will shot people in this book. a section on congressional spouses, which is pretty nice. they kind of run things. as i came to a conclusion in the book. and i must admit the conclusion.

is that there is so corrupt? jack aper mouth and i did and our staffs was the biggest scandal of this time, et cetera. for what he did codified into the legal situation today. i'd, if i am a lobbyist can take any member of congress or a staffer and have. i can take you hunting. i can take you to vegas. some republicans went to a clip to get a little bit under the personality last year they had a fundraiser. either side can do this. citizens united. i thought john mccain on campaign finance reform twice. his bill still was worthless. worthless as it was back then. he made two posted 520 sevens. at the end of the day, with citizens united drooling and lack of a true campaign finance

reform bill, you have a situation today for a super comes along. we can pick up karl rove or george soros, whichever side of the aisle you want to skewer. the average member in order to counter that these $3 million, which is $10,000 a day. they take their staffer, go across the street of federal time and get on telephone to the dccc or the under cc and they do that. that doesn't mean we've got that members. i promise you many members of congress would like this to change, too. many members do not find it delightful to raise this money. ..